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CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES OF
NEW YORK CITY
CONSTRUCTION EXPENDITURES AND CONTRACTS AWARDED
NYORK CITY'S capital expenditures increased with great
rapidity during the five or six years after the World War.
Per capita figures (based on Table 59) rose from $5.42 in
1919to$19.64 in 1924. During the next four years the an-
IIU4.LIlgu-te icuialiiedahnosi coiisiaiii around in 1929,
however, a sharp increase occurred, followed by further in-
creases in i930and i931 toa peak, in the latter year, of little
under $29. The decline during the next two years was pre-
cipitous. By 1933, when the figure was $8.70, the public
improvement program was virtually at a standstill. Between
1931and1933totalconstruction expenditures fell no less
than 70 per cent.
The increase in 1930and1931doesnot, however, reflect
successful efforts to expand construction work deliberately
for the purpose of affording unemployment relief. This is
revealed by the course of construction awards, presented in
Table 58, which shows that these reached their peak in 1928.
Between 1928 and 1931,whileexpenditures increased 50
per cent, contracts awarded fell 40 per cent. In 1932 their
volume was, in comparison with previous years, negligible.
Because figures of contracts awarded indicate activity about
to be initiated rather than current operations,' any deliberate
For a discussion of the difference between the two series and an analysis






































































































Total public construction $79,520 $32,913 $74,252 $56,989 $68,878$106,297PURPOSE
Educational buildings1
Hospitals and institutions
































































Source:F.W. Dodge Corporation, Statistical Division
Private schools, which were subtracted from thefigures for
educational buildings in earlier years. are included since3926.
Iii1919they amountedto$963,000;3920,$854,000;3921,














$232,479 $196,521 $188,408 $140,713 $32,555Q
Not reported in these years.
New York City Board of Transportation figuresof
awarded for subway construction.
contracts
H







EXPENDITURES ON FUBLIC CONSTRUCTION, 1919_19331
(in thousands) z
PURPOSE 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925
Subways $11,795 $7,764 $6,965 $4,224 $5,927 $8,641$18,583 Z
Streets,roads and parkways 2 8,306 10,257 13,759 12,738 15,747 23,828 29,982 0
Buildings3 3,346 5,791 12,227 14,500 25,155 59,441 48,831
Water suppiy systems, etc. 2,096 2,430 6,365 10,704 14,501 12,145 8,gig
Docks and ferries, etc. 339 6,465 17.277 6401 4,546 4,436 9,766
Borough presidents 3,816 5,135 12,405 6,330 6,927 8,952 14,425
Parks and park buildings 6i 1,200 1,445 s,8g5 2,860 3,501 2,275 fl
Miscellaneous i66 24 143 io6 ... 90
Total expenditures $29,774 $39,208 $71467 $56,635 $75,769 $120,944$132,871
Ct7
PURPOSE 1926 1927 1928
Subways $50,849 $64,356 $57,636
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
$79,125 $84,100 $79,785 $48,561 $16,219
Streets, roads and parkways 1 32,808 36,677 31,170 32,307 36,731 29,115 s8,ogg 5,282
Buildings3 22,373 22,003 24,201 39,239 38,948 37,320 25,247 7,821
Water supply systems, etc. 7,833 7,701 6,215 9,853 19,034 27,251 9,683 2,421
Docks and ferries, etc. 5,755 3,768 5,807 4,883 6,482 8,621 4,769 2,530
Borough presidents 9,663 6,765 4,663 4,367 8,699 8,297 6,302
Parks and park buildings 1,763 1,775 1,970 2,304 3,779 4,458 2,833 492
Miscellaneous 350 500 1,059 1,244 1,077 7,803 16,725 21,699
Total expenditures $131,394 $132,721$174,013$194,518$203,052$134,208 $62,766
Source: New York City, Comptroller's Annual Reports z
The figures include all expenditures, however financed, for new Expenditures mainly for school construction.
construction and reconstruction, hut omit maintenance and opera- Excludesexpendicuresbyboroughpresidentsfromspecial
tion costs. Expenditures for the acquisition of land arc excludedrevenue bonds included in note 2.Thisclass represents miseellane-
throughout. ous building to some extent hut the greater part is ftr repaving
o Includesexpendituresbyboroughpresidentsfromspecial





so212 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
attempts to accelerate public construction, or at least the degree
of success attending such efforts, would be better reflected in the
former than in the latter. Comparison of the projected programs
authorized or prepared in detail for the great spending agencies
in 1928 and 1929 with the actual expenditures in 1930 and 1931
shows that the increase in construction expenditures represented
in the main the normal execution of work planned and con-
tracted for prior to the depression.
Table 59, which presents a classified summary of all ex-
penditures by New York City, however financed, for new
construction and reconstruction yearly, 1919—33, shows that
the items mainly responsible for the increase between 1929
andi 931 were water supply systems, docks and ferries,
Borough. Presidents, and miscellaneous. The increases in
the first two categories reflect little deliberate acceleration
for relief purposes; the sharp rise in the last-mentioned class
is explained chiefly by large 'work relief' expenditures.
In Table 6o the same comprehensive categories are used
but the classification is also in terms of the various methods
by which these expenditures were financed. Expenditures fi-
nanced from special revenue bonds, special accounts, tax
notes and from current revenue are all seen to have been,
throughout the period covered, of minor importance com-
pared with expenditures financed by issues of long-term
corporate stock or bonds. In certain items, for instance,
parks, the increase between 1929 and 1931 probably reflects
some degree of deliberate expansion of expenditures for the
purpose of relieving unemployment. In New York, as in a
great many other cities throughout the country, unemployed
men were set to work on minor construction, reconstruction
and repairs in the municipal parks. The reasons for the in-
crease of expenditures in some of the other classes, such as
the Board of Water Supply, are examined more fully below.
In 1932 and 1933, despite large expenditures for emergencyNEW YORK CITY 213
workrelief,total expenditures for construction declined
drastically.
The tax budget includes very few items for permanent im-
provements, capital outlays for these being financed almost
entirely by issue of long-term corporate stock or bonds.
For purposes of comparison and comprehensiveness, however,
such summary as can be made of the volume of construction
work and the purchase of supplies and equipment financed from
current revenue is presented in Table 6i in the form of annual
appropriations.2 It may be seen that none of these appropriations
are, strictly speaking, for new construction, all such work in New
York City being financed by bond issues, as indeed is also a large
volume of repair and maintenance work. Reference to Table 6o
shows clearly that the amount of public works financed from tax
receipts is of relatively negligible importance. Table 6i does not
give the total amount even of expenditures for materials, supplies
and equipment: on the contrary the major portion of such ex-
penditures are also financed by bond issues.
CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOLS BEFORE AND DURING THE
Tables 58 and 59 show that the construction of subways,
water supply systems, streets and schools has accounted for
the major part of New York City's outlays on permanent
improvements in recent years. Expenditures for the first
three purposes did not fall sharply until 1932. The decline
in the construction of schools, however, began in 1930, de-
spite the still serious shortage of adequate educational facili-
ties, with resultant overcrowding of pupils. This decline
2Becauseof the difficulty of collecting figures on actual expenditures, the
figures of annual appropriations constitute probably the best available index
of the amounts spent out of tax receipts on repairs, maintenance, supplies
and equipment. The Comptroller's office believes that budget appropriations
and actual expenditures correspond very closely and advises the use of ap-
propriations as a satisfactory measure of expenditures.PURPOSE
Specialrevenue bonds
Buildings
Borough presidents, five boroughs
Miscellaneous
Total special revenue bonds




Streets, roads and parkways
Docks and ferries, etc.
Buildings
Parks and park buildings
Borough presidents, five boroughs





Streets, roads and parkways
Docks and ferries, etc.
Buildings
Parks and park buildings
Borough presidents, five boroughs
Miscellaneous
Total tax notes
$842 $688 $1,366 $875 551
143 77 ... 90
985 765 1,366 965 1,024
11,795 7,764 6,965 4,213 5,927 8,641 18,566 50,733 ()
2,096 2,430 6,354 10,704 14,474 12,141 8,886 7,823
7,190 7,742 11,220 10,579 13,721 20,84426,887 30,285
339 i6,666 5,626 3,758 4,051 8,654 4,024
3,346 5,791 12,939 14,21824,26858,04647,264 19,981
6t 1,200 1,296 1,426 1,526 2.043 1,110 526
3,816 5,135 8,413 5,628 5,524 4,262 4,393 1,593
28,643 36,527 63,853 52,394 69,198 110,028115,760 114,965
2 2 ••• ... ... 17 ii6
2 2
. .. 57 4 33 10
2 2 •••
... 3 497 247
2 2 6ii 788 385 1,112 1,731
1 2 288 282 887 1,395 1,567 2,269
1 2 149 469 1,334 1,458 1,165 1,237
2 1 3,992 702 1,403 4,69010,032 8,070
2 2 24 ... 29 ... ... ...
2 2 5,075 1,939 4,468 7,93514,423 13,680
TABLE Go
NEWYORK CITY
EXPENDITURES ON PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION, CLASSIFIED BY
COMPREHENSIVE TYPES AND METHOD OF FINANCING, 1919-1933
(inthousands)
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1726
15 i66




Restoring and repaving streets, borough
presidents 721 1,218 1,197 1,317 1,338 1,615 1,723 1,725
Total special accounts 721 1,218 1,197 1,317 1,338 1,615 1,723 1,725
Expenditures from current revenue1





EXPENDITURES ON PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION, CLASSIFIED BY
COMPREHENSIVE TYPES AND METHODS OF FINANCING,
(in thousands)
PULtPOSE 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Special revenue bonds
Buildings














Total special revenue bonds
























Water supply system, etc.
Streets, roads and parkways
Docks and ferries, etc.
Buildings
Parks and park buildings
Borough presidents, five boroughs



























































S'treets, roads and parkways -. 14 i8 3 ... ... ... ...
Docks and ferries, etc. 1,483 2,431 2,977 4,108 4,227 1,024 422
Buildings 2,011 1,482 2,480 4,126 7,088 4,437 i,8to
Parks andpark buildings 1,505 1,829 2,087 2,267 3,187 2,222 182
Borough presidents, five boroughs . 4,232 2,426 4,259 3,070 6,028 8,io8 6,206
Miscellaneous .. 409 321 676 421 253 79
Total tax notes 9.488 8,896 12,21214,46021,446i6,8ii 9,258Source: New York City, Comptroller's Annual Reports
These sre, strictly speaking, tax budget appropriations for repay-
jog and resurfacing streets, except $2,500,000forairport con-
struction included in 1929.
Noseparate statement is given during 1919and1920.During
shesc two years expenditures financed out of tax note issues are
included in sht Corporate Stock Fund Account. Tax notes issued
amounted to $2,050,000in1919andto $4,250,00010 1920.
Includesunemployment (work relief) expenditures. fnr a variety
of purposes, of $10,791,000.
Includesunemployment (work relief) expenditures, for a variety






PURPOSE 1927 1928 1929 1930 '93' 1932 1933
Special accounts
Buildings 115 102 3 35
Docks ... 140 31 ... 408
Restoring and repaving streets, borough presidents 1,743 1,724 1,408 0,553 t,t36 727
Total special accounts 1,965 1,985 t,758 1,443 5,96t t,t36 727
Expenditures from current revenue' 7,000 7,000 11,000 8,750 7,450




Streets,highways and bridges, care and
maintenance (personal service) $5,154
Repaving and maintenance; resurfacing
streets and avenues (contracts)
Public buildings and offices; care and
maintenance
a. Personal service 398
b. Contracts
Construction and equipment of new
municipal airport
Protection of life and property (contracts) 4,049
Consumable supplies, total ii
Equipment, total 2,178
Materials, repairs and replacements 4,106
AND FOR SUPPLIES,
1920 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 Z
$6,224 $6,645 $7,348 $7,339 $8,253 $8,955
488 480 506 526 572 627
1,043 1,267 1,510 1,743 2,075
4,152 3,235 3,372 3,746 4,015 4,332
13,612 13,166 14,470 14,787 14,119 14,927
3,053 3,190 4,646 4,508 5,560 5,581
8,052 8,497 8,741 9,571 8,883
TABLE 6i
NEW YORK CITY
TAX BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS FROM CURRENT REVENUE FOR PUBLIC WORKS




Streets,highways and bridges, care and
maintenance (personal service)
Repaving and maintenance; resurfacing
streets and avenues (contracts) 7,000
Publicbuildings and offices; care and
maintenance
a. Personal service 687
b. Contracts 2,725
Construction and equipment of new
municipal airport
Protection of life and property (contracts) 4,621
Consumable supplies, total 15,986
Equipment, total 6,152












1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
$10,094 $11,273 $9,644 $10,280 $10,497 $10,438 $8,895





Source: New York City, Department of Finance, Bureau of Accountancy (Table of Budget Appropriations,
by Board of Estimate and Apportionment in Annual Budgets)
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cannot be mainly explained by the already greatly increased
expenditures in 1929, for although these were markedly
larger than during immediately preceding years, they were
substantially less than in 1924 and 1925. Table 62 presents
disbursements and contracts awarded for school construction
yearly since 1925. The annual drop in both after 1929 is very
sharp, but is much more marked in the latter, which indi-
cates that the volume of new work initiated was being con-
tinuously and very rapidly cut down.
During the earlier years of the depression the reduction was
not primarily due to a shortage of funds. The construction
schedule for 1931 officially designated by the Board of Education
TABLE 62
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS AND CONTRACTS AWARDED














Source:New York City, Board of Education
1Figuresare I o'rall construction disbursements, including expenditures on equipment,
furniture, etc., and on the acquisition of sites. These disbursements are all made from
corporate stock funds.
2Nonew contracts awarded.
called for an ultimate outlay of about $68,ooo,ooo, the largest
building program in the history of the city's school system. It
included items totaling about $24,000,000 carried over from the
schoolbuilding program of the preceding year. Earlier in the
depression funds appear to have been clearly available for ac-
celerating construction. An obstacle, however, was the greatNEW YORK CITY 221
difficulty of enlarging at short notice the physical facilities of the
staff in charge of planning and administration. As the depression
continued, however, the explanation of the drastic reduction in
construction expenditures lay mainly inthecity's growing
financial difficulties.
CONSTRUCTION OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS
The sharp rise in 1930 and 1931 in expenditures for the
construction of water supply systems, in contrast to school-
building outlays, does not reflect deliberate emergency ac-
celeration of construction. It merely represents the execu-
tion of plans prepared and contracts awarded a considerable
time previous. The figures of Table 63, average monthly
63
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY
CONTRACTPAYMENTS FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION,
AND NUMBER EMPLOYED, 1918-1933
CONTRACT PAYMENTS'
YEAR (in thousands) NUMBER
1ST QUARTER 2ND QUARTER 3RD QUARTER 4TH QUARTERTOTAL EMPLOYED2
1918 $64 $172 $165 $210 $Gii 132
1919 388 376 334 145 1,243 491
1920 252 347 330 332 1,261 619
1921 407 868 1,214 1,939 4,428 1,527
1922 1,270 1,858 2,535 2,299 7,962 2,116
1923 1,225 1,979 3,353 3,997 10,554 2,108
1924 768 1,500 1,935 1,282 5,485 1,083
1925 413 683 1,013 927 3,036 648
1926 319 439 721 347 1,826 345
1927 120 134 234 200 688 152
1928 54 45 8i 41 221 59
1929 25 730 2,147 2,398 5,300 889
1930 1,812 1,489 3,806 4,646 12,753 2,141
'931 4,276 5,336 6,209 4,159 19,980 1,848
1932 2,555 2,391 599 512
1933 508 323 567 323 1,721 141
Source: NewYork City, Board of Water Supply
'Theseare figures of payments for contract work actually performed and not contracts
awarded.
2Undercontracts for construction of new water supply. Figures are averages of the
number employed in the last week of each month.222 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
payments made by the Board of Water Supply for construc-
tion work performed by contractors on new water supply
systems, reveal a rapid rise, 1918—23,anequally rapid fall
thereafter through 1928, sharply mounting expenditures for
the succeeding three years and drastic reduction in 1932 and
1933. The fluctuations in the average monthly number em-
ployed naturally correspond closely to variations in expendi-
tures.
Expenditures and employment in 1929—3 iwereaugmented by
a construction program launched in 1928. At the end of that
year the Board of Water Supply had outstanding contracts
amounting to over $40,000,000forthe construction of a water
supply delivery tunnel. Moreover, the first steps had been taken
towards the initiation of the Delaware River Supply System, a
new program for the construction of additional sources of water
supply for the city. In 1928 the probable cost of this plan over
the ensuing twelve years was estimated at around
Even if this program is ignored, however, the Board of Water
Supply by the end of z928 had already initiated a considerable
volume of new construction. Four contracts for the delivery
tunnel mentioned abovewere awarded on October 5,1928,
aggregating over $42,000,000.Sinceadditional smaller contracts
were awarded by the Board of Water Supply in 1929, and in
view of other concurrent expenditures during this period, it
becomes clear that the greatly increased expenditures of 1929—31
werethe direct outcome of projects planned, initiated and con-
tracted before the onset of the depression. The course of con-
struction during the last twenty-five years reveals alternating
New York City, Board of Water Supply, Annual Report, 1928, Appendix
I, p. 83.
4The construction of this project, known as City Tunnel No. 2,wasoriginally
approved by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment on March to, 1927.
At the same time the Board authorized the issuance of corporate stock to
the amount of $64,000,ooo to provide the requisite funds for its construction.
The entire project was approved by the State Water Power and Control
Commission on June 15, 1927. During 1928 two contracts, awarded April 12,
1927, were completed at a cost of $241,438.C-
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phasesof expansion and contraction as old supplies of water
were fully utilized and new ones had to be tapped. Contracts
awarded, as compared with a total of almost $43,000,000 in 1928,
amountedto less than $i,ooo,ooo in each of the succeeding three
years.
This decline was no indication that the city found its existing
provision for water supply adequate or was likely to do so in
the near future. On the contrary, it was faced with a serious
problem in this respect, and its administration prior to the de-
pression was only too willing to expend liberal sums in the
construction of additional water supply facilities. The delay
arose from inevitable obstacles of cumbersome procedure, largely
of a legal nature, which had to be surmounted before the first
contract could be awarded.
The New York City Delaware River Supply Plan, mentioned
above, was designed to meet the city's needs for increased water
facilities. As early as June 17, 1921 the Board of Estimate had
authorized the Board of Water Supply to proceed with studies
and investigations for an additional supply of water for New
York City. Under a plan outlining the Board's recommendations,
submitted to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment on July
27, most of the new supply was to be derived from the
use of the flood waters of the tributaries of the Delaware River
west of the present Catskill development. These lie entirely
within New York State, but the Delaware River itself flows also
through New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Directly after the project
was authorized by the New York State Water Power and Control
Commission in May 1929, New Jersey—with Pennsylvania inter-
vening to the same end—requested the United States Supreme
Court to prohibit the proposed development, chiefly on the
ground that it would injure navigation on the Delaware. To this
New York City filed an answer on October 7, and the dis-
pute was referred to a master in Chancery for investigation in
January 1930. The latter's report, made to the Supreme Court
New York City, Board of Water Supply, Annual Retort, 1928, Appendix
I, pp. 79—106.
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on February 2,1931, recommendedthat it deny New Jersey's
demand that the state and city of New York be enjoined from
diverting any waters from the Delaware or its tributaries, and
that it grant New York's demand only to the extent of permitting
440,000,000gallonsdaily to be taken, instead of the 6oo,ooo,ooo
desired. On May 4, 1931theSupreme Court handed down a
unanimous opinion supporting its special master's findings, al-
lowing the city 444,000,000gallonsdaily from the Delaware
River. At best, however, it was estimated that the proper devel-
opment of the Delaware system would require ten years.6 As
the President of the Board of Water Supply explained, a tn-
State agreement to authorize the Delaware watershed diversion
had been urged by him to the Governors of New York, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania as early asi921! Theremoval of all
legal obstacles was thus finally effected ten years after this project
was first suggested.
RoArmuILDING
The above examination of construction expenditures and
programs for water1 supply systems illustrates the difficulties
that beset the acceleration of large-scale projects at short
notice in times of depression. The problems surrounding
attempts to expedite the construction, reconstruction and
repair of streets are of a different and less serious nature: the
greatest, the seasonal element, receives detailed dis4cussion
in Chapter XII. In respect of the volume of employment
created, roadhuilding expenditures in New York City are of
even greater importance than those for the construction of
either school or water supply systems, normally being second
only to expenditures on subway construction.
Roadbuilding and roadrepairing are performed by several
different agencies in New York City, and expenditures are
°Opinionexpressed by Thaddeus Merriman, Chief Engineer of the Board of
Water Supply, reported in the New York Times, May 5, 1931..
tNewYork Times, April 8, 1931.TABLE 64
NEW YORK CITY
EXPENDITURES ON ROADBUILDING, 1928-1933
(in thousands)
MxTHOD OF FINANCING PURPOSE
Special revenue bonds,
borough presidents Paving and repaving
Corporate stock Tn-Borough Bridge, etc.
Assessment bonds Street Impovement Fund
Tax notes Bronx River Parkway
Special accounts Restoring and repaving
Current revenue Repaving and resurfacing
Total expenditures from all sources
Source: New York City, Comptroller's Annual Reports
z
2928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
$403 $359 $599 $237 $x6g $42
.. .. . 1,678 998 79
22,006 21,721 25,011 18,197 55,790 4,434
'8 ... . .. . ...
1,743 1,724 1,408 1,553 1,136 727
7,000 8,500 8,750 7,45° .- .








financed from a variety of sources. The summary totals of
expenditures yearly fromi 919 to date are presented in
Tables 59 and 6o. The same data for 1928—33 are presented
in greater detail in Table 64.8 Total roadbuilding expendi-
tures increased slightly in 1930 but fell off sharply during
the succeeding three years. The reason lies partly in their
nature and financing. Assessment bonds are used to assist in
the financing of the Street Improvement and the Street and
Park Opening Funds, the most important items in road-
building expenditures in New York City. The first defrays
the cost of road construction, reconstruction and paving and
other similar assessable improvements, the other the cost of
lands acquired for these purposes. Such expenditures, being
for assessable improvements, involve a highly elaborate and
protracted procedure, which does not allow the rapid acceler-
ation of construction projects. The land must first be ac-
quired, and to this end petition is made by the local board
of the Borough President to the Board of Estimate. Con-
demnation proceedings are instituted only •after a public
hearing. Maps showing the area of assessment must be pre-
pared, submitted to and approved by the Board of Estimate.
The Court must hear both interested sides before making
tentative awards, and must hear objections before it makes a
final award. Only after all these and a great many other steps
have been taken can the Board of Estimate give preliminary
8Special revenue bonds provide for supplementary appropriations and are
redeemed out of tax receipts in the budget succeeding the year of their issue.
Expenditures financed in this manner by the five Borough Presidents are for
paving and repaving streets and avenues. Long-term corporate stock and tax
notes, a form of temporary borrowing which follows exactly the same proce-
dure as special revenue bonds, are not used to finance ordinary road con-
struction or repair work but larger projects such as those indicated. Expendi-
tures from special accounts, made by the five Borough Presidents, are defrayed
partly from revenues derived from two of the large city bridges and amounts
received for the opening of streets where pavements are restored by the
Borough Presidents with these funds. Expenditures from current revenue
and those financed with assessment bonds are self-explanatory.NEW YORK CITY 227
authorizationto the Borough President under whose control
the project falls to proceed with the work of physical im-
cannot be dab-
orate contracts, plans and specifications have been prepared.
The volume of much-needed public works in the construction
and reconstruction of streets, roads, express highways and the
like in New York City was very large even prior to the depression.
The Borough President of Manhattan declared in 1930thathalf
the street systems and highways of New York must eventually be
rebuilt, and the modernizing of roadways was so extensive a
project that a large number could be employed continually. In
the other boroughs streets in many sections, even in populous
neighborhoods, have been in deplorable condition. Apart from
financial problems raised by the depression, however, it is diffi-
cult to increase rapidly the volume of such work in progress at
any given time. This is even truer of the major roadbuilding and
similar projects for which such a pressing need is felt for the
relief of traffic congestion.
RAPID TRANSIT CONSTRUCTION AND CITY FINANCES
By far the most important purpose of municipal construc-
tion expenditures in New York City in recent years has been
subway building, as may be seen from Tables 59 and 6o.
During the last decade it has accounted for a third of all
public construction expenditures. In 1930 expenditures for
this purpose reached the record figure of $84,000,000, fol-
lowed by a sharp decline during the ensuing three years to
only $i6,ooo,ooo in 1933. Table 65 shows that the number
employed on subway construction has fluctuated in close
correspondence with expenditures. A steady upw.ard move-
ment to a peak in 1930 is followed by a sharp decline. The
figures for contracts awarded, however, show a peak in 1929
and a very rapid drop during the succeeding four years. The
absence of deliberate acceleration during the depression is
manifest. The reasons were various: the difficulty of speed-228 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
TABLE 65
NEW YORK CITY
CONTRACTS AWARDED FOR SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION,
AND NUMBER EMPLOYED, 1921-1933
CONTRACTS AWARDED
YEAR (in thousands) NUMBER
1STQJJARTER 2NDQUARTER 3RDQUARTER 4THQUARTER TOTAL EMPLOYED'
1921 $69 $206 $185 $3,867 $4,327
2
1922 508 2,039 753 2,882 6,182
2
1923 388 i,g66 93 2,541 4,388
1924 132 765 139 6,759 7,795
2
1925 11,959 18,797 24,371 23,032 78,159 2,560
192625,348 3,085 8g6 25,373 54,702 8,020
1927 23,629 23,106 421 30,787 77,943 9,713
1928 15,065 13,868 32,013 25,657 9,597
.1929 29,667 20,009 29,083 12,583 91,342 11,520
1930 15,551 21,272 9,892 31,738 78,453 11,772
1931 1,489 6,232 5,805 14,900 28.426 9,736
1932 2,230 2,350 1,219 653 6,452 5,180
'933 .. . . ... 479 479 1,167
Source: New York City, Board of Transportation
1Figuresare annual averages of the daily average number employed during each month.
2Notavailable.
ing this type of work, the complexity of many of the financial
problems involved even prior to the depression, and their
material aggravation as the latter developed. In no measure
was the retardation due to adequate rapid transit facilities.
The elaborate plans drawn towards that end are far from
nearing completion. A brief discussion of the difficulties en-
countered should serve to illustrate the obstacles often lying
in the way of enlarging the volume of construction even of
projects for which the need is pressing, and to show how, in
New York, the subway problem has dominated city finances
as a whole.
The numerous legal requirements entailed in the con-
struction of new transit facilities often result in the postpone-
ment of actual construction for months or years after plans
have been drawn up by the Board of Transportation.
Under the law, public hearings must be held and may extendNEW YORK CITY 229
overseveral years, during which everyone interested must be
given an opportunity to be heard. The completed plan usually
represents a compronise between the taxpayers on the one hand
and the and financial neccssiticsthe situation on
the other. Before the plan can be approved by the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment, however, the consent of the prop-
erty owners along the right-of-way must be obtained. Again,
before contracts can be submitted for bids, they must first be
considered at a public hearing and then presented for approval
to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. If the contractor
sublets portions to subcontractors, each of the latter must also
be approved by the Board of Estimate.
The financial problems raised by its vast program of sub-
way Construction have been the most important that the city
has had to face. Prior to the depression they were thought
to have been largely solved. With the constantly and rapidly
mounting assessment list, and with $300,000,000addedby
state legislation to the city's debt limit, New York seemed
able to find money for the new subways. Moreover, it was
estimated that the termination of the emergency housing
laws in 1932wouldadd about a billion dollars to the city's
assessment list and a hundred million—io per cent of the
assessed valuation—to its legal borrowing power. Chairman
Delaney of the Board of Transportation was thus able to
advocate successfully before the Board of Estimate the policy
of issuing four-year bonds redeemable out of the budget to
finance subway building. During 1927—30inclusivesuch
bonds to a total of $208,000,000wereissued with provision
for their retirement through redemption by appropriations
against the budget.
This plan was designed to preserve the five cent fare—the
sacrifice of which in New York City was considered by all parties
to be a political impossibility—without increasing the tax rate.
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brought about by the depression, it became clear that if persisted
in this system would either cause increases in the tax rate or
compel the city to reduce other essential public services. In two
reports made to the subcommittee on the pricing of city services
of the Mayor's Committee on Taxation in October 1930and
June 1931'° respectively,the conclusion was reached that the
Delaney plan could not be continued in operation. In 1933it
was abandoned. Its failure was due to several factors: construc-
tion costs had exceeded original estimates, the original schedule
for sinking fund requirements had not been fulfilled, and
assessed valuations on realty had not increased as expected. In
addition, the city's financial burden resulting from the operation
of the new lines at a five cent fare proved far heavier than origi-
nally contemplated, for much less revenue was produced from
the operation of these lines than had been estimated under the
DeTaney plan when the short-term financing scheme was forinu-
lated. But the fundamental factor in the plan was the expected
large increases in assessed valuations, half of the proceeds of
which were to go for subway construction. General economic
conditions, however, stultified this expectation. The Delaney
plan worked while assessed valuations were increasing rapidly,
making it possible to keep the basic tax rate below the $2.66 limit
fixed in the original scheme. The Rogers reports recommended
the abandonment of the plan and the substitution of the policy
of issuing long-term bonds. The great advantage of rapid amor-
tization lay, however, in releasing hundreds of millions of frozen
credit from the debt limit.
Thus the city was faced with the dilemma that largely
because of changed conditions in real estate values brought
about by the depression it found itself unable to proceed
with its original plan of financing subway construction with-
out ruinously affecting other city services; while on the
other hand ifit substituted a policy of issuing long-term
°Thc '98' Tax-Rate and the Delaney Plan, by Lindsay Rogers.
10Memorandumon the Cost of Rapid Transit to the City of New York, by
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bonds it was in danger of finding itself saddled with an em-
barrassingly heavy load of frozen credit and involved in
difficulties with its constitutional margin of debt-incurring
power.
RETARDATION OF NEEDED PUBLIC WORKS: CONSTRUCTION
PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK
Subway construction affords perhaps the most conspicuous
example of delay on a badly-needed project as a result of
financial, legal and administrative difficulties. But other in-
stances of retardation in consequence of obstacles which,
although less serious, tend to prove almost equally time con-
suming, could be multiplied indefinitely. A few examples
chosen at random may be offered.
The Port of New York Authority, a New York—New Jersey
Interstate Commission that can operate more expeditiously than
either the state or city administration, found it easier to span
the Hudson River with a gigantic bridge than make headway in
the face of the vested interests and prejudices arrayed against
an inland freight terminal of an estimated cost of $i6,ooo,ooo
which it had long been eager to build. Agreement had to be
reached with twelve railroads serving the port area, but the
latter, accustomed to look askance at any innovation tending to
disturb the competitive equilibrium, were reluctant to relin-
quish their ancient competitive freight-handling practices. At one
time political differences threatened to delay the project in-
definitely. When a site had been selected, real estate interests
on the west side of Manhattan raised new objections. Only in
1931 were these difficulties finally overcome, the city's consent
obtained, and agreement reached with the railroads.
After several years of agitation and discussion the Board of
Estimate at the end of January 1931 approved the program for
the development of Jamaica Bay for shipping and industrial
purposes by the construction of a railroad along the marginal
way and the dredging of Paerdegat Basin. The city had, how-232 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
ever, been committed to the project for fifteen years, and large
sums had already been spent there by the city, state and Federal
governments. In June 1925 the Board of Estimate had approved
an extension of the tracks of the Long Island Railroad, and in
June 1928 a subcommittee of the Mayor's committee on plan and
survey submitted a report calling attention to the potential de-
velopment of the bay as a subport of New York harbor. When
the program was finally approved the city was entering a long
period of serious financial embarrassment which necessitated
stringent curtailment of expenditures.
The elimination of railroad grade crossings affords a good
example of a type of very necessary public improvement which
could not be hastened very much for purposes of unemployment
relief for somewhat different reasons. The cost of this work is
borne not by the city but jointly by the state government and the
railroads.11 The volume to be performed in New York City was
large. Early in November 1930 the Transit Commission an-
nounced that every effort was being made to hasten this type of
work in conformity with the Governor's request that public
works be expedited as a means of unemployment relief.12
But before the depression this work had been pushed as ex-
peditiously as possible in view of legal and other difficulties. As
early as 1925 the voters of New York State had amended the
Constitution by approving in a referendum the bond issue of
$300,000,000 for this purpose.'3 Having decided to spend this
sum the state government very naturally felt that the work should
be finished as rapidly as it could be done efficiently. Further-
more, because of the joint administration of the projects by the
state and the railroads and of the extended quasi-judicial pro-
cedure involved, this work does not lend itself to speedy execu-
tion. After a specific elimination project has been determined
upon, about two years are usually consumed with hearings, ne-
"For the financing of grade crossing eliminations see Laws of New York
State, 1926, Ch. 233; 1927,Ch.445; 1929, Ch. 645; Highway Law, 1929,p.385;
and Planning and Control of Public Works, p. 75.
13Releaseof The Transit Commission, November 3, 1930.
13 NewYork State Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 14.NEW YORK CITY 233
gotiations,discussions, preparation of plans, and the acquisition
of rights-of-way before actual construction is started. This pro-
-cedureis followed for each individual elimination project under
consideration, and by its very nature cannot be greatly hastened.14
Thus there can be no hope of any adequate control over
public works so long as the city lacks a comprehensive and
integrated system of planning its improvements. Despite the
splendid efforts of non-oflicial organizations such as the
Russell Sage Foundation with its Regional Plan of New
York, the city's method of procedure has been most hap-
•hazard. Its practice during good times has been to commit
itself to a vast number of projects often before detailed plans
have been prepared or the financial problems involved have
been considered. The result has naturally been constant
confusion, delay and uncertainty.15
Even when money has been authorizedforconstruction
projects the award of contracts is frequently delayed. Thus on
January 31,1931 authorizedpublic improvements for which
funds had been voted amounted to $249,405,000,butthe charges
against this total in contracts already awarded were only $144,-
337,000,leavinga balance of authorized but uncontracted im-
provements of a value of $1o5,o68,ooo. The huge volume not
merely of needed public works but also of projects to which the
city was already committed was shown by a report on the esti-
mated costs of general improvements undertaken by the city
submitted on February 5,1931 bythe Comptroller to the Board
of Estimate. The almost complete absence of any long-range
planning for the financing or orderly execution of the improve-
"For details of the procedure involved, see Planning and Control of Public
Works, pp. 84—6.
TheBoard of Estimate, preoccupied with a great many other functions, has
often yielded to the strongest pressure. "If a locality needed an improvement
and raised sufficient clamor," the Mayor remarked in 1930,"theimprovement
wouldbeprovided, even though it rendered impossible the supplying of a
like need in some other locality more in need but less vociferous" (New
York Times, October 21,1930).
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ments projected by the city is there very clearly revealed. The
program of public improvements to be financed by bond issues
alone to which the city administration was committed at that
date was in excess of two billion dollars. This figure excluded
work to be financed by budget funds, short-term obligations or
assessments, an important source of certain construction expendi-
tures. "This additional $2,000,000,000wouldhave more than
doubled the City's debt. Moreover, the City has never succeeded
in borrowing more than $]5o,000,000ina single year, yet all of
these projects were planned for immediate execution. At the
time that these facts were disclosed the Board of Estimate did
not even know the extent of its commitments." 18
Thedesirability of setting up a strict budget for corporate
stock and tax note issues has often been urged. Hitherto, depart-
ment heads have made their requests for these in the same
fashion as they have requested funds from the tax budget, the
requests being summarjzed in 'the corporated stock and tax note
calendar'. Hearings by the Board of Estimate have usually been
held in April or May, but extra funds were applied for during
the year as needs arose. Thus between the calendar and inci-
dental requests, the Board of Estimate has been obliged to make
appropriations for individual projects without opportunity to
compare their merits with those of others and has financed them
bit by bit."
t6New York City's Budget, Memorandum by Joseph McGoldrick.
it"TheCommittee which Mayor Walker appointed in 1927tinderthe Chair-
manship of Mr. Herbert Lehman, the present Governor, recommended many
improvements in the City's budgetary methods, but .... hardlyany of its
suggestions were followed, although various civic groups urged them from
time to time. Early this summer (1933)ageneral reorganization both of the
City's current and capital budgeting was effected through Charter amend-
ments adopted by the Municipal Assembly under its Home Rule power.
The pressure of the financial emergency and the approach of the Municipal
election has made it difficult to put these in operation. The City administra-
tion's troubles are so enormous that it can hardly be blamed for virtually
ignoring the new requirements in the preparation of the current budget"
(New York City's Budget, Memorandum by Joseph Mccoldrick). The city
nowhasan official Budget Bureau, with a Director of the Budget at its head.NEW YORK CITY 235
FINANCING PUBLIC WORKS
THE CITY'S DEBT
Meanwhile New York's outstanding debt has been steadily
growing. The tremendous increase during the last half
century and the shifts in the classification by purpose is
shown in Table 66. For sonic years the greater portion has
been accounted for by rapid transit construction and the
building of schools, water supply systems, streets and sewers.
In Table 67, which gives the city's outstanding debt at the
beginning of each year since 1925, and the debt contracted
during the course of the year, these classes of construction
are not unexpectedly found to have been responsible until
very recently for the major part of the latter. In 1932, how-
ever, borrowing for relief purposes bulks large, and in 1933
accounts for most of the new debt contracted. Of particular
interest is the fact that until 1929 the total outstanding debt
increased at a slower annual percentage rate than did assessed
valuations off taxable real estate, while from 1930 it increased
markedly more rapidly.
The provisions of the state constitution that define and
restrict the power of New York City—as of other cities of the
state—and the method of computing its debt-incurring power
within the debt limit imposed, are described in detail in
Appendix B. As is there pointed out, New York City has
frequently found this constitutional debt limitation embar-
rassing, and its borrowing powers have repeatedly had to be
enlarged by constitutional amendment. The city's constitu-
tional debt-incurring leeway at the beginning of each year,
1920—34, is presented in Table 68. The third column, which
shows that portion of the debt-incurring power still not ear-
marked by the Board of Estimate, is the most significant.




GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE OUTSTANDING DEBT,
(in thousands) r
(yearas of January i)
PURPOSE '886 i8g8 '9" 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Z
Rapid transit ., $64,652$273,610$301,609$380,610$446,110$557,110$636,110$696,110 $682,260 Z
Schools $s,z68 $18,045 110,367 243,117 263,074 278,212 301,374 331,687 350,215 365,427 358,888
Watersupply17,747 53,083 130,821254,233277,203287,972299,686310,054 326,148325,607364,766 Z
Streetsand
sewers 16,963 24,992 164,460212,209 252,459 230,995256,198240,930 241,59725S,211 257,369
Public buildings,
other than
schools 6,345 24,359 75,030 505,962 538,583 127,005 160,527 171,001 160,785 170,146 172,874
Docks 52,053 34,033 108,783 141,955 143,298 146,354 159,936 166,862 166,842 171,671
Bridges 5,587 53,474 93,782501,944sos,s65 100,144 67,482 65,114 64,800 64,418 64,329 fl
Parks 13,250 28,845 62,606 57,781 56,957 56,227 62,958 49,799 49,264 49,511
Miscellaneous,
including re-
funding 52,055 25,568 36,622 83,243 56,847 84,900 74,03! 61,912 74,934 76,129 84,584
Total $125,475$223,018$857,953 $1,551,198 $1,692,419 $1,824,352 $1,947,543 $2,070,715 $2,169,401$2,207,606
Source:Comptroller'sannual statement of the Constitutional Debt-Incurring Power of the City
Including assessment bonds.TABLE 67
NEW YORK CITY
PURPOSE OF NEW DEBT CONTRACTED YEARLY, 1925-1933
(in thousands)
PURPOSE 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Januaryi each year—outstanding debt $1,459,589 $1,565,854 $1,660,994 $1,761,819 $1,858,548
Plus: newdebtadded annually 126,033 126,933 132,118 134,796 169,254
Total 1,585,622 1,692,787 1,793,112 1,896,615 2,027,802
Minus: annual redemptions of debt 19,769 31,793 31,292 38,068 58,909
December 3' each year—outstanding debt 1,565,853 1,660,994 1,761,819 1,858,548 1,968,893
Yearly percentages of increase in debt 6.i 6.i 5.5 5.9
General purposes of new debt
Rapid transit 20,360 51,355 64,660 61,041 99,404
Water supply 9,960 7,660 7,970 7,015 11,369
Dockimprovements 6,925 2,350 17,003 3,132 7,071
School construction 41,788 19,199 25,780 41,610
Various municipal purposes, hospitals,
Brooklyn Municipal Building, etc. 26,950 35,724 18,510 12,828 8,260
Home and emergency work relief .... .. .... ....
Brooklyn-RichmondTunnel 50 500 .... .... 1,5402
Construction of sewers, highways, etc. 20,000 10,145 7,000 25,000
Total 126,033 126,933 132,118 134,796 169,254
Assessed valuation of taxable real estate $12,997,581$14,539,838$15,845,506 $17,133,817
Yearly percentages of increase in taxable real estate.... 9.211 ii.866 8.g8o 8.130TABLE 67 (cont.)
PURPOSE
January i each year—outstanding debt
Plus: new debt added annually
Total
Minus: annual redemptions of debt
December 31 each year—outstanding debt
Yearly percentages of increase in debt





Various municipal purposes, hospitals,
Brooklyn Municipal Building, etc.
Home and emergency work relief
Brooklyn-Richmond Tunnel
Construction of sewers, highways, etc.
Total
Assessed valuation of taxable real estate
Yearly percentages of increase in taxable real estate
NEW YORK CITY






















Source: New York City, Department of Finance, Bureau of Accounting
Includes new debt for Tn-Borough Bridge and Mid-Manhattan
East River Tunnel from 1930,andundistributed debt for general
purposes iii 1932and1933.
Awarded by Supreme Court for acquisition of land.

































AND UNRESERVED DEBT MARGIN,
(in thousands)
YEAR TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS CONSTITUTIONAL UNRESERVED
AS OF WITHIN DEBT DEBT-INCURRING DEBT
JAN. 1 LIMIT POWER MARGIN
1920 $772,354 $70,478
1921 799,098 63,514 35,233
1922 822,032 175,267 133,643
1923 851,818 173,181 128,515
1924 911,283 148,323 67,116
1925 991,458 123,424 47,011
1926 1,088,387 101,748 42,175
.1927 1,172,614 127,144 101,521
1928 1,253,064 200,920 162,410
.1929 1,269,969 314,582 266,504
1930 1,248,883 464,499 379,686
1931 1,268,136 552,219 307,529
1932 1,339,360 541,257 36o,6o8
1933 1,340,076 621,618 600,841
.1934 1,351,111 495,190 462,5702
Source: New York City, Comptroller's Annual Reports
1Thesefigures were obtained by deducting the total indebtedness within the debt limit
(gross funded debt minus debt excluded from limit, in accordance with the state con-
stitution) from an amount equalio per cent of the assessed valuation of the taxable
real estate of New York City. The result constitutes the debt-incurring power; what-
ever part of this amount was not specially authorized by the Board of Estimate and
Apportionment is represented by the unreserved margin.
2Inaddition to this amount there is still an unencumbered balance of $38,813,000 out
of a $300,000,000credit,without the constitutional debt limit, which may be used by
the city "for the construction or equipment, or both, of new rapid transit railroads".
an unencumbered balance of $38,813,000 out of a $300,000,-
ooo credit exempted from the debt-limit provision for the
construction and equipment of rapid transit facilities. On
the whole, the unreserved debt margin increased substan-
tially during the depression, and the city was far from ex-
hausting its constitutional debt-incurring power.En this
particular respect, therefore, there would have been no great
danger in the expansion of public works financed by borrow-
ing. The difficulty was political and economic rather than.
legal. While the unreserved debt margin of New York was
nearly half a billion dollars at the beginning of 1934,, its240 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
credit had been so seriously impaired by mounting delin-
quencies and financial profligacy that it was no longer able
to market its securities. Between 1931 and 1933, borrowing
For rapid transit construction declined from over $94,000,000
to $6,500,000, for water supply purposes from over $30,000,-
000 to little more than $i,ooo,ooo, for school construction,
from $21,000,000 to $500,000 (Table 67).
THE BUDGET AND MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS
A factor as important as the limitation of the city's con-
stitutional debt-incurring power in restricting public works
expenditures financed by long-term borrowing is the rate of
interest and the amount in which bonds can be sold. Table
69 shows how the rate at which the city has borrowed has
fluctuated with prevailing money market conditions.
TABLE 6g
NEW YORK CITY
LONG-TERM BOND ISSUES, 1924_19331
DATE AMOUNT INTEREST RATE BASIS
(in thousands) (per cent) (per cent)
June 3, 1924 $37,ooo2 4¼ 4.19
June 3, 1924 41/4 3•99
May 5, 1925 6o,ooo 41% 4.045
February i6, 1926 75,000 41% 4.185
May fl, 1927 6o,ooo 4 3.938
February 29,'928 52,000 4 g.866
November20,1928 55,000 41/4 4.2002
May 20,1929 52,000 51% 4.8065
December ii, 1929 65,000 41,4 4.351
October 21,1930 50,000 4 3.9986
March 4, 1931 41% 4.134
May 12,1931 52,000 3 2.997
January 25,.1932 ioo,ooo4 6 6.o
May .19, 1932 51,4 5•5
November i, 1933 4 4.0
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle
Excluding those sold to the city's sinking funds.
2Corporatestock.
Serial bonds.
Three- to five-year corporate stock notes.
• Serial bonds for work and emergency home relief.NEW YORK CITY 241
Conditions of security inflation and dear money are reflected
in the high basic cost of the issues in the latter part of 1928 and
in May 1929.Thesale of December 1929wasoriginally scheduled
for the middle of October, but the city was forced to postpone
its financing for almost two months because of the stock market
crash. Almost a year later, in October 1930, it was compelled to
reduce an offering of $75,000,000to$50,000,000becausecondi-
tions in the bond market had become unsettled since the financ-
ing had first been announced: in the interval the uncertainty in
the stock market had been communicated to the bond market
and dealers were reluctant to commit themselves in long-term
issues. The reduced amount was sold at the favorable net interest
rate of less than 4 per cent. Seven months later the city was able
to market an issue of $52,000,000ata net interest rate of less
than 3 per cent, the lowest cost on record since its incorporation
in 1898, and in contrast to the rate of 4.81 on the issue sold a
year previous—a striking indication of the easy money conditions
prevailing and of the consequent demand for high-grade mu-
nicipal bonds. Eight months later, however, early in 1932,the
situation was completely changed as a result of the city's grow-
ing financial embarrassment and the international financial un-
easiness. The course of events is traced in detail in Chapters
X and XI. On this occasion the city had great difficulty in bor-
rowing $ioo,ooo,ooo on three- to five-year corporate stock notes,
and eventually did so only by going to the legal limit of 6 per
cent. The city was able to carry on without default only as a
result of special negotiations with the banks.
During 1932and1933 New York City's finances suffered
a succession of crises.18 The immediate source of the diffi-
culties lay in the accumulation of short-term obligations.
These consisted of revenue bills issued in anticipation of
In this period five sessions of the legislature, three of them extraordinary
sessions, dealt with the city's financial problems. In what follows in this sec-
tion I have drawn freely upon the memorandum on New York City's Budget
by Professor Joseph McGoldrick, subsequently Comptroller of New York
City, and wish to acknowledge his generous assistance.
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taxes, corporate stock notes issued pending the sale of long-
term securities, tax notes and special revenue bonds issued
for one year, and various classes of special revenue bonds
and certificates of indebtedness issued to provide money for
unemployment relief. Each presented a special problem.
In normal times the city had been able to borrow on its
revenue bills at not more than 2 per cent. During the depression,
however, owing to hard times and lack of confidence in the city
administration, the volume of tax delinquency had risen sharply.
Since, consequently, these revenue bills could not be retired,
they accumulated slowly. The percentage of real estate taxes
remaining uncollected at the end of the year had risen from i i
in 1927 to 26 in 1932. The city was forced to borrow not only
against future collections but also against a rising amount of
arrears.'9 The growing volume of revenue bills had to be re-
newed continually for a few months at a time, and at each
renewal date tim difficulty became increasingly acute.
In the city's credit had been so good that it was able to
sell its corporate stock notes at 1.25 per cent.2° Refunding into
long-term corporate stock, which would have had to be sold at
around 4 per cent, was therefore postponed. As things turned
out, this delay proved unfortunate, for bond market conditions
and the city's credit greatly altered for the worse.21 Since 1931
Theannual budget carries an item designated Tax Deficiency; this, how-
ever, provides not for current delinquency, but for delinquencies in real
estate deemed uncollectible and outstanding more than four years. Thus the
Tax Deficiency item in the 1933budgetwas for real estate taxes delinquent
for the year 1929orearlier, and took no account of more recent increased
delinquencies.
20Unlikemost other cities, New York has generally financed public improk'e-
ments not by first selling bonds and then letting contracts and meeting the
bills from the funds on deposit in the banks. It has followed the reverse
procedure of first awarding contracts, then selling short-term corporate notes
to obtain the money to pay for the work, and subsequently, when these notes
have accumulated in large volume, of refunding them into long-term bonds
known as corporate stock.
This situation was not substantially improved by legislation later enacted
permitting the sale of corporate stock notes for three-, four- and five-year
terms.NEW YORK CITY 243
thecity has not been able to sell a long-term bond issue, and in
1933wascarrying its corporate stock notes not at 4 per cent but
at 5.75percent; towards the end of the year the volume out-
standing was little short of $200,000,000.Likerevenue bills they
had been continually maturing, and each maturity date brought
another crisis.
The thirdclass of short-term obligations mentioned above,
certain one-year special revenue bonds and tax notes permitted
under various charter provisions, were of much smaller aggre-
gate volume. Lastly there were the obligations issued to provide
for unemployment relief. This was treated by the city as an
emergency problem to be met by borrowing. The sum of $75,-
ooo,ooo was added to the city's indebtedness for work relief,
mainly in certificates of three to five years' maturity and in short-
term obligations. In October 1933thegross total of unfunded
debt was $475,000,000andthe funded debt $2,290,000,000.Dur-
ing the year Mr. Samuel Untermyer, special counsellor and ad-
viser on financial matters to the Board of Estimate, had charged
that the city's credit was "completely shattered and destroyed"
and that the city was tottering on the verge of bankruptcy.
In the autumn of 1933 it was clearly evident that unless drastic
measures were adopted, New York would be faced with the im-
mediate prospect of defaulting on its obligations. Under Mayor
O'Brien the Delaney plan had been abandoned and payroll
Cuts amounting to $45,000,000hadbeen made. In all $i13,000,-
000 hadbeen cut from the budget for 1933asfinally adopted.
The Bankers' Agreement, negotiated in September, made it
possible for the city to finance current needs without difficulty
and at a moderate cost, and brought the recurrent crises over
short-term debt to an end.22 But the agreement was conditional
22Underthe Bankers' Agreement outstanding tax notes were funded for three
years at 4 per cent, a reserve for delinquent taxes was created and provision
was made for a revolving fund to finance the city's current needs over a
period of four years. Savings banks, Jife insurance companies and other
similar institutions agreed to purchase $70,000,000worthofper cent ten-
year serial bonds, $32,ooo,000 to be used for the retirement of the outstand-
ing certificates of indebtedness, the remaining $38,000,000forcurrent relief
expenditures. By the end of the year the outstanding revenue bills had been244 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
upon further economies and a balanced budget. When the Fusion
administration took office in January 1934, however, the budget
was ouE of balance by about $31,000,000andthe city's bonds
were selling at a discount. Passage of the Economy Act, reduc-
tion of expenditures by the new administration and the imposi-
tion of new taxes quickly improved the city's credit. Bonds which
sold in 1933belowhave been virtually at par for some time,
and most of the city's issues are selling above par.
These reforms, however, which have made it possible for
the city to square its outstanding accounts, preclude the hope
of large expenditures for new construction for some time.
Still another example is afforded of the inability of local
governments to undertake expanded programs of public
works in depressions when they have not carefully preserved
their credit during prosperity. The public works program
in New York City today must necessarily be limited chiefly
to projects that can be financed with the aid of Federal
funds. On May i6, 1934thecity finally succeeded in demon-
strating that its budget was properly balanced and received
$37,558,500 from the PWA for completion of seven projects
delayed for months because it had not been able to qualify
for huge loans and grants.23 It was estimated that altogether
a total of i,6oo,ooo man-days of work were involved. Had
its finances been in better shape New York could have re-
ceived the money months earlier.
THE TAX RATE
Sincein New York City public are financed
to a negligible extent from current revenue, the height of
either paid off or refunded for three years, and the corporate stock notes had
also been refunded, though for only nine months. The certificates of indebted-
ness had been exchanged for the serial bonds.
23Themajor allotments were in the form of loans and grants but several
other awards were strictly loans.Over $23,000,000 was for subway construc-
tion, 30 per cent being a grant and the balance a loan.NEW YORK CITY 245
thetax rate has no direct bearing upon construction expendi-
tures. Debt service charges, however, must be carried in the
while the invoived in the aiternative
method of financing further capital outlays by long-term
borrowing have been sufficiently dwelt upon above.
"During the period of Mayor Walker's incumbency, budget
making was rendered delightfully simple by the fact that the
City's income was expanding steadily. In each of the five years
from 1926 to 1930,taxvalues in New York City rose by more
than $i,ooo,ooo,ooo. The peak was reached in 1927when$i,-
500,000,000 oddin new values was added to the City's tax rolls.
Applying the current tax rate, which at this period was kept at
about $2.60, to these annual increases, the City had between
$25,000,000and$40,000,000ofnew money available every year.
Budget making, therefore, consisted of apportioning this increase
among the ever-eager departments.... Noeffort was made to
examine the department's entire budget. Once it achieved a
particular total, that total became a vested interest, and atten-
tion was confined to requests for additional allowance." 24
The total amount of the budget to be raised by tax and
general fund revenues in 1930was$569,770,000; in 1931it
hadrisen to $620,840,000, and in 1932 to $631,366,000. In
1933areduction to $518,428,000 was effected.25 In 1926 the
tax budget had amounted to $437,000,000;inthe interval
assessed valuations had also increased, hut the rate of annual
increase has been steadily slower.
By far the largest single appropriation in recent budgets
has been for debt service provisions, which alone account
for overper cent of the total sum to be raised by tax and
general fund revenues. In recent years new debt has been
contracted much more rapidly than old obligations have
been redeemed. Only rising real estate valuations made it
New York City's Budget, Memorandum byJoseph
New York City, Annual Budgets.246 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
possible for the city to sell these bonds without exceeding
the debt limit, and to collect increased tax receipts without
exceeding the tax limit. Such a condition ceased to prevail
during the depression, and is not likely to return in the near
future. Although the gap between the contraction of new
debt and the redemption of old narrowed somewhat during
the depression, it still continued large; meanwhile the yearly
rate of increase in assessed valuations was markedly slower
(see Table 67).
In the face of these conditions a considerable increase in
the tax rate for 1931and1932wasinevitable at a time when
real estate, as a result of the depression, had generally fallen
in value throughout the five boroughs, when rents could not
be collected as readily or in the same amounts as previously,
and when, in consequence, real estate owners could not pay
the taxes they had been able to pay in times of active busi-
ness. The rise in the city and school tax rates in recent years
has been especially marked. During the depression, when
annual increases in assessments were becoming smaller, pub-
lic works could not be expanded unless taxes were greatly
increased. On the other hand, the difficulties that beset any
increased volume of financing through borrowing made that
course impossible. Thus one course was left open—drastic
retrenchment—if the city was to avoid default; and this course
meant curtailment rather than expansion o. public works
expenditures.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The failure to expedite public works for purposes of un-
employment relief in New York City during the depression
affords a highly instructive example of the obstacles likely
to be encountered unless, through careful forethought,
machinery has been devised well in advance of a depression
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whichwill allow the speedy acceleration of construction at
the desired time. The difficulty did not lie in finding public
improvements that could be undertaken with manifest profit
to the community: on the contrary, many projects to the
eventual execution of which the administration was defi-
nitely committed were already greatly delayed. Nor did the
character of the city's financial structure present insuperable,
or even considerable,difficulties. The greatest obstacles
proved to be threefold in character, but were highly inter-
dependent:first, those of a technical and administrative
sort, due in large part to an unwieldy, complicated and
slowly moving administrative machinery, with divided con-
trol and diffused responsibility, which made all the more
difficult the cutting of 'red tape' and the reduction of the
inevitable delay involved in planning and initiating public
improvements; second, the difficulties arising from the ab-
sence of any comprehensive system of advance planning of
physical improvements as a well-ordered whole, or of long-
range budgeting for their financing; third, the difficulties of
a financial nature arising from the very heavy financial
burdens to which the city had committed itself in years of
prosperity without knowing very clearly how it was going to
meet them: burdens the weight of which was greatly in-
creased by conditions created by the depression itself in a
variety of respects interacting and reinforcing one another
to bring about a situation in which retrenchment rather than
further expenditure was clearly indicated as the paramount
need. In such circumstances, and faced with growing unem-
ployment which demanded immediate attention, the city
naturally found it simpler and easier to meet the crisis
through direct measures which, though less desirable eco-
nomically and not even having the merit of adequacy, did
afford immediate and clearly tangible relief: measures which
in large part took the form of outright charity.